Institutional intervention or marginalization: Civil-Military relations in Latin America based on Argentina and Ecuador cases

Abstract

This article compares civil-military relations in Argentina and Ecuador following the third wave of democratization, employing historical institutionalism and the comparative method to explain the current state of these relations. Despite sharing a 20th century marked by coups d'état, authoritarian regimes, and the "double-currency game," the two countries diverged radically after their respective transitions. In Argentina, the discrediting of the final dictatorship—due to its involvement in human rights violations—prevented the military from playing a leading role in the post-transition democracy. In contrast, Ecuador's Armed Forces retained their legitimacy and prestige, repeatedly acting as arbiters during the ousters of presidents Bucaram, Mahuad, and Gutiérrez. The study concludes that critical junctures during the transition—rather than economic or institutional variables—explain whether the military remains a political actor or returns to the barracks, demonstrating that the "double-currency game" persists in Ecuador but not in Argentina.